After a heated and polarized presidential campaign, both parties have shifted their focus to the 2026 midterm elections and the 2028 presidential race — the Republicans aiming to solidify their position and the Democrats seeking to regain power. However, one issue that can unite Americans is the need for bipartisan accomplishments that serve the nation’s interests. One such goal is satellite resilience, which refers to the ability of space systems to withstand and recover from disruptions, including intentional attacks. This resilience ensures that space continues to provide vital support for both military and civilian operations essential to national security and economic well-being.
While the two parties disagree on many aspects of President-elect Donald Trump’s policies, space resilience remains a nonpartisan priority, with Americans from all sides calling for it. Both Trump’s first term and the Biden administration have recognized the importance of space resilience, investing heavily to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, neither fully acknowledged the risk that China’s emerging dual-use spacecraft could soon become a primary weapon for launching large-scale attacks on our satellites. Addressing this new space threat is more about bipartisan collaboration than funding. If both parties commit to the effort, there is a significant opportunity to achieve this essential resilience over the next four years.
In 2021, former Indo-Pacific commanders Adm. Phil Davidson and Adm. John Aquilino warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping was accelerating China’s military modernization and moving the timeline for a potential invasion of Taiwan from 2035 to 2027. China understands that United States satellites are crucial for everything from communications and intelligence to precision strikes. Disabling U.S. satellites at the onset of such an invasion would undermine U.S. military capabilities, either deterring intervention or significantly degrading response efforts, thereby increasing the likelihood of a successful Chinese takeover of Taiwan.
Since the fall of mainland China to communism in 1949, every U.S. administration has viewed a forcible reunification of Taiwan with China as a disaster for Taiwan and the free world. This must be prevented. The Biden administration reaffirmed this stance with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which opposes “any attempt by the [People’s Republic of China] to unilaterally impose a timetable for unification on Taiwan.” To deter China’s aggression, the U.S. must not only bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities but also maintain a robust intervention capability, with strong support from space.
China’s successful 2007 test of anti-satellite missiles exposed the vulnerability of U.S. satellites. Since then, the U.S. has made significant investments to counter various types of anti-satellite weapons, including those that destroy satellites, jam their signals, blind their sensors, or spoof and eavesdrop on them. Yet one of the most pressing threats — the development of spacecraft designed to stalk and disable satellites — has received inadequate attention from both Trump during his first term and the Biden administration.
Since 2008, China has been developing rendezvous spacecraft capable of both peaceful functions such as refueling and repairing satellites and hostile actions such as disabling U.S. satellites or repositioning them to orbits where they cannot perform their missions. In 2022, China successfully docked with a non-responsive, dead Chinese satellite in geosynchronous orbit, demonstrating a breakthrough in docking technology that surprised many experts. They had expected it would take China several more years to reach this level of proficiency. China now has the technical ability to use these dual-use spacecraft to disable U.S. satellites in the near future.
Regardless of the administration, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces two key challenges in responding to this growing rendezvous threat. First, the DoD’s traditional secrecy policy prevents the release of information about how damaging an anti-satellite threat will become and by when. It also believes that a credible threat assessment must rely on classified intelligence data, thus limiting threat assessments to its own staff and those at Federally Funded Research and Development Centers. A key purpose of the DoD’s secrecy policy is to keep China in the dark about what the U.S. knows regarding its rendezvous spacecraft capabilities. However, given that China’s dual-use spacecraft are being developed and deployed openly for peaceful applications, China knows that any inquisitive analyst can deduce its growing ability for hostile actions from unclassified data on civilian applications.
Using open data, Georgetown University director of debate Brandon Kelley and I have estimated that in the next several years, China could deploy about 200 rendezvous spacecraft to disable 100 critical U.S. satellites of its choosing in a surprise attack — essentially a “Space Pearl Harbor,” as the Rumsfeld Commission warned more than two decades ago. Such an attack could precede a large-scale Chinese invasion, providing China with significantly better capabilities in seizing Taiwan within this decade.
On Nov. 12, President-elect Trump announced his intention to create a Department of Government Efficiency led by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy. With Musk’s deep understanding of space and his proven ability to deliver timely solutions, the duo could play a key role in making U.S. satellites resilient. This outside advisory body will report to the White House and complete its work by July 4, 2026. They should recognize that the DoD is mistaken in withholding unclassified information about China’s ability to disable U.S. satellites, and that the DoD must proactively collaborate with independent experts from all parties involved in open studies. Many of these experts are patriotic and willing to volunteer their services to address this growing threat. Such collaboration would be a cost-effective way to enhance DoD efficiency and improve preparedness for this threat.
The second challenge is that the DoD’s focus on developing proliferated satellite constellations for the 2030s will come too late. Many legacy satellites critical for military and civilian functions will still be vulnerable in the 2020s, leaving them exposed during a period when China could plan its assault on Taiwan. The vulnerability of these satellites, combined with China’s growing invasion capabilities, could incentivize China to act sooner than expected.
Fortunately, in 2018, President Trump’s Space Policy Directive-3 recommended that the U.S. define “transit volumes used by existing satellites.” These volumes or zones are similar to self-defense zones — a concept that political scientist Albert Wohlstetter and I proposed in 1985 and later expanded upon in a submission to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy in 1988. These zones would allow countries the right to inspect and expel any intruding spacecraft, thus protecting critical satellites inside these zones. In 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin acknowledged the need for such zones to “maintain safe separation” in space in his memorandum on the Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space. With bipartisan support, the next step is to establish clear boundaries for these zones and impose consequences for violators.
Moreover, these zones should be protected by bodyguard spacecraft, similar to how important individuals or objects are escorted for protection in the air, sea and land domains. These spacecraft would monitor and defend satellites by removing any intruders from the zone without causing harm to them. This approach is straightforward and effective, ensuring the protection of critical space assets and maintaining the balance of power in space.
Musk and Ramaswamy should quickly recognize that U.S. dual-use rendezvous spacecraft, originally designed for peaceful purposes, could be repurposed as bodyguard spacecraft. They should also understand that the U.S. has the capability to develop bodyguard spacecraft that are more efficient than China’s rendezvous anti-satellite spacecraft. This is an area where the U.S. must — and can — outcompete China.
Establishing transparent and enforceable self-defense zones as a practical and timely way to protect satellites requires little financial investment. Should other solutions be proposed, they should be assessed and compared with each other by a diverse group of experts assembled for this satellite-resilience project.
A rough estimate of the lifecycle cost of protecting 100 critical satellites by producing and deploying 200 bodyguard spacecraft of 200 kilograms each would be on the order of $5 billion, based on the cost per kilogram extrapolated from the lifecycle cost of a 2,500-kilogram satellite in geosynchronous orbit. As the Air Force is replacing its aging F-15C Eagles with F-22 Raptors at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, aiming to enhance U.S. military capabilities amid escalating tensions over Taiwan, it is interesting to note that the lifecycle cost of an F-22 Raptor stealth fighter is $59 billion. If they must choose between buying 200 bodyguard spacecraft at $5 billion to protect 100 vulnerable satellites or purchasing one more F-22 at $59 billion, the DoD, Musk, Ramaswamy and others should consider whether choosing the bodyguards is the commonsensical decision – a choice both Republicans and Democrats would support.
Both parties have a crucial opportunity to address U.S. space vulnerabilities and defend Taiwan against China’s growing aggression. By proactively establishing self-defense zones and deploying bodyguard spacecraft, the U.S. can better protect its satellites, save Taiwan, and preserve the security of the free world.
Brian Chow is an independent policy analyst with a Ph.D. in physics, an MBA with distinction, a Ph.D. in finance, and over 180 publications.
